Policy Brief:
Generative AI
Dr Ann Kristin Glenster
& Sam Gilbert
October 2023
This report is authored by:
Dr Ann Kristin Glenster
Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy
Sam Gilbert
Bennett Institute for Public Policy
October 2023
About ai@cam
The University of Cambridge aspires to be a
global leader in AI research, an innovator in AI education, and a hub that
connects research with business, civil society, and policy, supporting the
deployment of AI technologies for wider social and economic benefit. Its vision
is of AI-enabled innovations that benefit society, created through
interdisciplinary research that is deeply connected to real-world needs. ai@cam is the University of Cambridge’s flagship mission to
deliver this vision, driving a new wave of AI innovation that serves science,
citizens, and society.
More information: ai.cam.ac.uk
About the Bennett Institute for Public Policy
The Bennett Institute for Public Policy is
one of the UK’s leading public policy institutes, achieving significant impact
through its high-quality research. Our goal is to rethink public policy in an
era of turbulence and inequality. Our research connects the world-leading work
in technology and science at the University of Cambridge with the economic and
political dimensions of policymaking. We are committed to outstanding teaching,
policy engagement, and to devising sustainable and long-lasting solutions.
More information: www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk
About the Minderoo Centre for Technology and
Democracy
The Minderoo Centre for Technology and
Democracy is an independent team of academic researchers at the University of
Cambridge, who are radically rethinking the power relationships between digital
technologies, society and our planet.
More information: www.mctd.ac.uk
DOI: doi.org/10.17863/CAM.101918
Table of Contents
2.1 What is generative AI capable of and how does it work?
2.2 Generative AI’s limitations
2.3 Foundation models vs applications
2.4 The economics of generative AI
3. Productivity and generative AI
3.1 Foundation model leadership
3.2 Real-world applications of foundation models
4. Impediments to developing the UK’s national
capabilities in generative AI
4.2 Ethical and
responsible generative AI
4.3 Personal data and
privacy concerns
5. Recommendations to build capability in Generative AI
Which path should the UK take to build
national capability for generative AI?
The rapid rollout of generative AI models,
and public attention to Open AI’s ChatGPT, has raised
concerns about AI’s impact on the economy and society. In the UK, policy makers
are looking to large language models and other so-called foundation models as
ways to potentially improve economic productivity.
This policy brief from Dr Ann Kristin Glenster and Sam Gilbert outlines which policy levers could
support those goals. They argue that the UK should pursue becoming a global
leader in applying generative AI to the economy. Rather than use public support
for building new foundation models, the UK could support the growing ecosystem
of startups that develop new applications for these
models, creating new products and services.
A UK approach to generative AI could leverage
the existing national strengths in safe, responsible
and ethical AI to put human safety and flourishing at the forefront of
innovation. A national approach could achieve these goals by increasing
understanding of and access to generative AI tools throughout the economy and
society.
This policy brief answers three key
questions:
1. What policy infrastructure and social capacity does the UK need to lead
and manage deployment of responsible generative AI (over the long term)?
2. What national capability does the UK need for large-scale AI systems in
the short- and medium-term?
3. What governance capacity does the UK need to deal with fast moving technologies,
in which large uncertainties are a feature, not a bug?
Thanks to Ann Kristin and Sam’s extensive
research, this policy brief maps out an ethical framework for the governance of
generative AI, through the creation of an AI Bill.
We hope that this policy brief will be useful
to a wide range of stakeholders and address how we can use regulatory and
legislative power today, to ensure that the British public can trust how this
technology is used.
We are also excited that this policy brief
brings together expertise from three groups at the University of Cambridge: the
Bennett Institute for Public Policy, Minderoo Centre for Technology and
Democracy and ai@cam.
Evidenced-based, science-informed research
like this brief is what our three organisations do best, and we hope that our
insights can help decision-makers navigate public debates and policy choices
with more clarity.
Professor Dame Diane Coyle
Bennett Professor of Public Policy, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University
of Cambridge
Professor Gina Neff
Executive Director, Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy, University of
Cambridge
Professor Neil Lawrence
DeepMind Professor of Machine Learning, University of Cambridge
This policy brief aims to give the policy
community an overview of the generative artificial intelligence (AI) field and
highlight the key policy issues raised by its rapid development and adoption.
Our main findings and recommendations are as
follows:
·
Generative AI
represents a significant technological advance, of comparable importance to the
web, and offers a material opportunity for the United Kingdom (UK) to improve
economic productivity
·
The aspiration for the
UK to become a global leader in the development of the foundation models that
support generative AI products and services is unrealistic given the capital
investment and compute capacity required
·
The UK should focus on
being a leader in applying foundation models in the real world, to change how
things are produced, responsibly, safely, and fairly
·
Expanding understanding
of and access to generative AI tools throughout the economy and society is the
most important way that the UK can build capacity in responsible AI implementation
·
Innovation and skills
policy levers can be applied to this challenge, including lobbying major cloud
computing infrastructure providers to establish GPU-clusters in the UK, and
introducing tax incentives for businesses to apply generative AI technologies
to their existing operations
·
There are potential
legal, regulatory, cultural and societal impediments to the adoption of
generative AI which need to be addressed, including uncertainty over the
applicability of data protection, intellectual property, and product safety laws
·
The sectoral approach
to regulation based on value-based principles rather than enforceable
legislation means there is a risk that regulators will lack the capacity to
enforce their regulatory frameworks, or that sectoral regulatory frameworks
will develop with contradictory and incoherent rules
·
Currently, the UK’s
approach to regulating generative AI combines value-based sectoral regulation
with efforts to shape international agreements. As a result, businesses lack
incentives to comply with Responsible AI principles, with negative consequences
for public trust in organisations’ use of generative AI
·
We believe this can be
addressed through an AI Bill and sectoral legislation designed to embed an
ethical framework for the governance of generative AI in domestic law, along
with investment in strengthening regulatory capacity
This policy brief aims to give the policy
community an overview of the generative AI field.
It highlights the key policy issues raised by
its rapid development and adoption (section 2).
We focus in particular on the questions of what
is needed for the UK to unlock the productivity improvements promised by
generative AI (section 3), and what impediments will need to be addressed to reconcile
generative AI with emerging legal and ethical frameworks (section
4).
Finally, we make a set of recommendations for
building capabilities to augment productivity through generative AI (section
5). Explanatory infographics, case studies,
and a glossary of generative AI terminology (denoted by italics)
are interspersed throughout.
We note that AI is a contested term. For the
purposes of this brief, we assume a narrow definition of AI, taking it to mean
computer systems which can improve themselves without explicit instructions, by
making inferences from patterns in data.
The ‘AI’ we are concerned with is the kind
that (among other things) organises social media newsfeeds, determines the
sentiment of online comments, decides which adverts should be displayed on a
webpage, classifies medical images, or recommends music, films, or books people
might enjoy based on what they have previously consumed.
We recognise the debate about the potential
for developments in AI research to engender machine superintelligence that
poses an existential risk to humanity, but do not enter into it here – not
least because AI Safety is already addressed extensively elsewhere as the focus
of the UK’s Frontier AI Taskforce.[1]
We likewise acknowledge important critiques
which have drawn attention to the ways AI systems can reproduce bias and
injustice, taking as a given that all AI should be responsible
AI.[2]
Glossary
·
AI Safety – efforts to pre-empt AI causing serious harm to humanity
·
Frontier AI – foundation models that are so advanced they pose
serious risks to public safety
·
Responsible AI – the ethical practice of developing and deploying
AI systems in a way that is fair, transparent, trustworthy, and accountable to society
·
Large language
model (LLM) – an AI model
that can interpret, generate, and translate text
·
Prompt – the instructions a user gives to a generative AI model
·
Token – a unit of text or computer code, used by LLMs to
interpret and generate text; can be a single character, part of a word, or a
whole word
Generative AI involves running the kind of
pattern-matching that machine learning systems do, only in reverse.[3]
Rather than looking at data and finding existing examples that fit a particular
pattern, it draws on data to ‘generate’ new examples of that pattern.
Generative AI systems can therefore output original high-quality text, images,
audio, or video at mindboggling speed and scale.
Much of the excitement about generative AI
has been driven by the runaway popularity of ChatGPT,
a consumer facing app developed by OpenAI, which
reached 100 million users even faster than the app TikTok.[4]
ChatGPT is underpinned by a type of generative AI system called a large
language model (LLM). LLMs take instructions (or prompts) from users in natural
language, and then output text in response—from stump speeches to Shakespearean
sonnets and everything in between.
They work by predicting what word (or,
strictly, token) ought to come next in a sequence, based on inferences from the
vast corpus of data on which they have been trained, together with the user’s
instructions. While OpenAI’s GPT-4 is the best-known
LLM, there are many other examples (see Figure 2).
Although image-generation models like Midjourney use a different process called diffusion, from
the perspective of the user they work in the same way as LLMs.
Natural language text prompts can yield Van Gogh-inspired cover art for ‘Stairway to
Heaven’, Pope Francis in a Balenciaga puffer jacket, or more or less anything else than can be imagined and articulated.[5]
Glossary
·
Diffusion model – an image-generation model developed by
corrupting a dataset of images with ‘noise’, then learning how to ‘de-noise’
the data and recover the images
·
Training – the process of teaching an AI system to
interpret data
·
Prompt
engineering – the practice
of designing prompts with the objective of improving the quality of a
generative AI model’s output
·
Fine-tuning – a training technique used to customise a
foundation model for a specific purpose
·
Plugin – a software add-on that enhances a system’s
capabilities. A number of ChatGPT plugins are available.
·
Foundation model – the generic name for LLMs, diffusion models and
other general-purpose generative AI models which developers can use as the
basis for more specialised apps
·
API – short for Application Programming Interface; a
way of allowing different software applications to interact with each other
·
SaaS – short for Software-as-a-Service; software which is accessed over the web, rather than being
installed locally
·
Compute – shorthand for the computational resources
generative AI systems use to process data
At first sight these capabilities can seem
miraculous, but it is important to be aware of their limitations. Diffusion
models are not underpinned by an understanding of the physical world; they don’t ‘know’ what text symbols mean, or that human hands usually have five fingers.[6]
The results can be comical, nightmarish, or
simply wrong. Similarly, LLMs do not function like search engines, reliably
retrieving information from a database. Rather, LLMs generate new text
probabilistically, meaning that they often invent facts and refer to seemingly
plausible but non-existent academic studies and URLs (a phenomenon known as
‘hallucination’).
Overcoming these limitations requires a
combination of fine-tuning, prompt engineering, and plugins.
Both LLMs and diffusion models are types of foundation
model—a term describing models that others could ‘build on top of’ for many
different purposes. This is enabled by giving third-party developers API
access, allowing them to incorporate foundation model capabilities into
their applications.
New startups have
been able to develop software-as-a-service (SaaS) products that apply
foundation models in specific contexts.
For example, Harvey
AI uses OpenAI’s GPT
models in products designed to assist lawyers with research, contract drafting,
and document review.[7]
Established tech companies have enhanced
their products with generative AI features. For example, the graphic design
platform Canva introduced a text to image feature powered by the
DALL-E 2 model, and Microsoft added LLM-powered writing and editing features to
its Office 365 products.[8]
Providers of foundation models earn revenue
by charging a small fee for each API request. As a result, their business model
depends on the volume of API requests from applications being sufficient to
offset the massive compute costs involved in developing and operating
foundation models.
These costs are partly a function of the vast
size of training datasets. For example, the text used to train OpenAI’s GPT-3 model included a 45 terabyte archive of the web, 11,000 books,
and the entirety of Wikipedia.[9]
Processing such large quantities of data
requires Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). A single GPU designed by
market-leader Nvidia costs $10,000; and thousands of GPUs are needed to train a
single foundation model. Further compute costs accrue once models are released
and begin processing prompts from users. Analysts estimate that ChatGPT costs $40 million per month to
run, and that Microsoft would need $4 billion of compute if its GPT-powered
Bing Chat product responded to all queries from Bing’s users.[10]
A final nuance to note is that it is not
necessary for foundation model developers to own GPUs themselves—they can rent
GPU time from cloud providers as a service.
Glossary
·
GPUs – powerful chips originally developed to render 3D
images in video games, now used for training foundation models
·
GPU Cluster – a group of computers containing GPUs
Figure 1: A simple
schematic of the Generative AI ‘stack’
Currently, most real-world end users of
generative AI systems are paying nothing for the privilege, meaning foundation
model providers’ revenues are negligible – OpenAI
projects just $200 million for 2023.
Both development and usage of generative AI
is therefore currently being funded by venture capital and the balance sheets
of big tech companies –
a situation which will clearly not last
forever. It seems likely that a small number of dominant foundation model
providers will emerge and then increase prices to a level that produces
attractive shareholder returns.
In the interim, the biggest beneficiaries are
likely to be compute providers – Nvidia’s share price, for example, is +150%
year-on-year.[11]
Economics are more benign for application developers, as their foundation model
API costs rise and fall in proportion to usage of their products, and they can
switch between different model providers easily.
Company |
Maturity |
Generative AI Activities |
Financial Position |
US |
|
|
|
OpenAI |
Late-stage growth |
Develops foundation models for text, image, and audio-generation (e.g. GPT-4, DALL-E 2, Whisper); develops consumer apps
(e.g. ChatGPT) |
Valued at ~$28bn in April 2023; has raised $11.3bn in total[12] |
Meta |
Public |
Develops open-source LLMs (e.g. Llama2) |
$816bn market cap |
Microsoft |
Public |
Provides compute as a service via the Azure AI platform; develops
consumer applications (e.g. Bing Chat) and integrations
(e.g. Microsoft 365 Copilot); major investor in OpenAI |
$2.50tn market cap |
Nvidia |
Public |
Designs chips used in the training of foundation models; investor in
Inflection AI and Synthesia |
$1.15tn market cap |
Google |
Public |
Develops LLMs (e.g. PaLM2), consumer apps
(e.g. Bard); integrates generative AI into existing products (e.g. Gmail);
provides compute as a cloud service |
$1.68tn market cap |
Anthropic |
Growth-stage startup |
Develops LLMs (e.g. Claude2) |
Raised $450m at ~$4bn valuation in May 2023[13] |
Inflection AI |
Seed-stage startup |
Develops LLMs and consumer apps (e.g. Pi) |
Raised $1.3bn at $4bn valuation in June 2023[14] |
Jasper |
Growth-stage startup |
Develops SaaS tools for copywriting, based on OpenAI
LLMs |
Raised $125m at $1.5bn valuation in October 2022[15] |
UK |
|
|
|
DeepMind |
Acquired |
Developing a robot command language (RT-2) and LLM (Gemini)[16] |
Acquired by Google for ~$500m (2014)[17] |
Stability AI |
Seed-stage startup |
Develops image-generation models (Stable Diffusion) and LLMs (StableLM) |
Raised $101m at $1bn valuation (2022)[18] |
Synthesia |
Growth-stage startup |
Develops SaaS tools enabling users to create corporate training videos
with realistic digital avatars, based on proprietary models |
Raised $90m at ~$1bn valuation in June 2023[19] |
Arm |
Public |
Designs chips used in the training of foundation models; developing a
platform to power generative AI apps (TCS23)[20] |
IPO-ed at ~$55bn in September 2023 |
Graphcore |
Growth-stage startup |
Designs chips used in the training of foundation models |
Has raised $680m, but venture capital investor Sequoia has written off
its stake[21] |
Figure 2: Selected
Generative AI Companies, United States (US) and UK (continued)
We take the view that generative AI is a very
significant technology, of comparable importance to the web.
However, it cannot be taken for granted that
the adoption of generative AI will inevitably lead to whole-economy
productivity growth—indeed, the digital innovations of the last 15 years have
had no discernible impact on measured UK productivity.[22]
It must also be acknowledged that there is
still a lot of uncertainty about how generative AI will become economically
useful. Google search data suggests the predominant use-cases for ChatGPT are currently job applications and homework, which have little relevance to the economy.[23]
Meanwhile, most capital investments in generative AI companies to date have been at the foundation model and infrastructure layers; at
the application layer, the majority of venture-backed companies are developing
chatbots, virtual customer services assistants, writing tools, and features for
video games.[24]
While these may reduce operating costs in
contact centres and increase copywriters’ output and gamers’ play-time,
they are unlikely to have a transformative economic impact.
If the UK is to benefit from generative AI,
it needs to encourage direct application of the technologies to the productive
economy, across multiple sectors.
Stability.Ai: the UK foundation model leader?
Best known for the
open-source image-generation model Stable Diffusion, Stability AI was founded
in 2020 by former hedge fund manager Emad Mostaque.
In 2022 the company raised $101 million in a seed round led by Lightspeed
Venture Partners and Coatue.
Stable Diffusion XL,
released in July 2023, features the ability to generate words within images
(see ‘Generative AI’s limitations’), and has been favourably compared by users to Midjourney
and OpenAI’s image models.
A number of controversies surrounding Stability AI should be
noted. Recent months have brought a lawsuit from Getty Images, who claim that copyrighted
material was included in Stable Diffusion’s training data without permission,
together with allegations from former partners and employees of fraud, financial irregularities and intellectual
property theft.
Policy discussion has focused on how the UK
could become a world leader in the development of novel
commercial foundation models.[25]
We doubt that this is realistic, despite the
UK benefitting from a world-leading research base in underpinning technologies.
Training foundation models requires vast amounts of compute, and little compute
capacity is available in the UK. The £900m supercomputer announced by the
chancellor in March 2023 will not be online until 2026, and neither Amazon Web
Services, Microsoft Azure, nor Google Cloud have UK-located GPU clusters.[26]
Stability AI trains its foundation models on
clusters in the US. However, the idea of sending sensitive data offshore is
very unpalatable for all organisations concerned with privacy (including, say,
the NHS), and such data transfers are not reconcilable with UK law.
A related barrier is the limited availability
of investment capital to fund compute. Modest government support for the UK chip industry—which has strategic importance well beyond generative AI—speaks to
constraints on state spending relative to China and the US.[27]
Unlike the US, the UK has no big tech
companies with balance sheets large enough to invest meaningfully in foundation
model developers, and the UK venture capital market is far smaller ($31bn vs $235bn in 2022).[28]
Traditional startup
funding models where companies raise seed capital (~£1m) to develop a minimum
viable product, followed by larger and larger amounts of investment once they
have gained traction with customers will not work at the scale needed for
foundation model development.
The upfront capital requirements to develop
foundation models are of a different order of magnitude, making them unsuitable
for UK-style startup investing.
The foundation model layer is also not the
most economically attractive part of the generative AI ‘stack’. Most models
have been trained on the same openly-available data,
rather than proprietary sources, meaning there is limited scope for competitive
differentiation and defensible market leadership.
It is at least plausible that competition
between the likes of OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, and
Inflection will drive down prices, leading to foundation models becoming
increasingly commoditised. Meta’s open-sourcing of Llama 2 means that a powerful LLM is now available
for commercial use, without the upfront capital costs associated with building
these models, undermining the business model of the closed-source foundation
model developers.[29]
There remain, however, significant compute
costs associated with their use. There are also indications that the performance of open source models is progressing at pace.[30]
Given these market conditions, it is unclear how foundation model leadership
would contribute to economic productivity, even if it could be attained.
Other UK generative ai startups
Criteria: Raised
>$10 million; HQ in the UK
PolyAI – develops voice
assistants for enterprise clients that can handle tasks like hotel room
bookings, food orders and insurance claims
Papercup – develops software that dubs existing video content into different languages
Lifescore – platform
generating endlessly varying music based on original compositions and recordings
UnlikelyAI – in stealth mode; founder previously contributed to development of
Amazon’s virtual assistant Alexa
Instadeep – machine-learning platform provider, acquired by
BioNTech for £562 million in July 2023. Does not describe itself as a
generative AI company
Rather than building publicly or privately
funded competitors to the likes of OpenAI and Google,
we see greater opportunity for the UK in becoming a leader in how
foundation model are applied in the real world.
With smaller funding requirements,
application layer products which customise foundation model capabilities to
specific use-cases are a better fit for the UK venture capital market, and can build on existing strengths in sectors like
fintech, healthtech and cybersecurity.
A further opportunity could be leveraging the
UK’s research capabilities to drive progress in underpinning technologies and
to develop products which address specific major challenges at the foundation
model and infrastructure layers of generative AI, such as the detection of AI-generated content and cooling of data centres, as well as AI safety solutions.[31]
Glossary
No-code – an approach to software development which uses
intuitive drag-and-drop interfaces to allow people without programming skills
to build applications
Web framework – a set of tools
and resources designed to make it easier to build web applications
Case Study: Software Development with Generative AI
Ankur Shah is a
London-based technology entrepreneur, whose previous exits include footwear
brand Mahabis and adtech
platform Techlightenment.
“I trained as a
barrister and my coding skills are adequate for simple proofs of concept, but
I’ve always relied on outsourced developers when building new projects, which
is time-consuming and costly. But in the last 12 months generative AI has
changed everything. For people like me who want to build websites, apps, and
workflow automations it’s akin to a superpower.
“One simple example I
really like is Meoweler – a light-hearted travel site, ostensibly for
cats. It’s beautifully executed and provides a nice snapshot of thousands of
cities around the world. But what’s significant is that it cost only $140 to build, and
the guy who made it is a designer with no formal training in software
development.
"He found a freely
available database of cities, then wrote GPT and Midjourney
prompts to generate the content and images for each city in a consistent format
and style. Then he used the Svelte web framework to create URLs, page
components, and site search. It’s a similar approach to the one we’ve taken to
programmatically reviewing insurance
products*, albeit we use
a different web framework and are more focused on data quality.
"Features that
used to take months and cost tens of thousands of pounds, I can now build
myself in an afternoon with ChatGPT. It’s insane.
“But sites and apps
only scratch the surface. What’s exciting me at the moment
is systems that use LLM capabilities recursively. I love the idea of ‘teams’ of
AI agents that can take a request like ‘get me some quotes to have a heat-pump
installed’ and then automate the whole series of linked tasks needed to fulfil
it – background web research, shortlisting and prioritising suppliers,
contacting them for quotes, and so on. My intuition is,
it will be scrappy, bedroom-hacker types – not computer science graduates or
corporate IT departments – who get there first.”
* Author disclosure: Sam Gilbert is involved with this project.
Generative AI’s primary contribution to
productivity will be in changing how things are produced.[32] The
biggest benefits to productivity will not come from a small number of
technologically-sophisticated companies using generative AI to invent new
products, or cut their costs.
Rather, generative AI’s promise lies with
changing production itself, just as occurred with interchangeable parts (19th
century), assembly lines (1910s), just-in-time production (1980s), and
globalised supply chains (2000s). The best example is software.
The code interpreter plugin for ChatGPT and LLM-powered tools like GitHub
Copilot are already enabling developers to write code up to 55% faster than before, presenting a potential solution to the UK’s chronic developer labour shortage.[33]
Even more significant is how generative AI
expands the scope of no-code, enabling people without programming
knowledge to build increasingly sophisticated software applications. In the
past, which systems and automations could be developed was constrained by the
availability of workers with skills in programming languages. Generative AI
tools effectively remove this constraint for some types of development, meaning
that the capability to imagine what a system might do and to articulate how it
ought to function becomes more valuable than formal computer science training—a
paradigm brought to life by the case study on the previous page.
When it comes to productivity, in our view the
most important national capability is a means of widely disseminating
understanding of and access to generative AI tools through the economy and
society.
There is good evidence that only a minority
of firms are adopting existing digital tools in ways that enhance their
productivity and commercial success, pulling ever further ahead of the pack.
The gap could grow with the powerful new capabilities afforded by generative
AI. The national economic challenge is to spread know-how among businesses and
employees. There is a role for government and AI experts to encourage learning
about the potential of generative AI, not only through sharing techniques and
examples but also through the range of business support tools available.
In some ways this runs counter to prevailing
trends: many organisations have banned their employees from using generative AI applications, reasonably fearing it could lead
to data leaks and/or the loss of intellectual property.[34]
While understandable, such practices inhibit
the bottom-up emergence of productivity opportunities inside organisations.
There is also some anecdotal evidence that productivity gains from generative
AI are already being realised, but lost to forms of
arbitrage.
Remote workers secretly use ChatGPT to get more free time or impress their superiors; marketing agencies
outsource content writing to LLMs while leaving their client fees and
service-level agreements unchanged.[35]
Incentives must be created for expert users of generative AI tools to
share their techniques.
Several impediments may hamper efforts to
unlock the full potential of the UK’s capabilities for generative AI.
There are economic impediments in terms of
lack of investment, and impediments from the challenges of scale of the
technical infrastructure, as explained in previous sections. While the UK has
not adopted specific legislation to regulate generative AI, there are some
restrictions in existing laws, notably concerning personal data protection and
intellectual property.
Further, there is an impediment to the uptake
of national capabilities in generative AI in that these technologies are
considered unethical and untrustworthy by some.[36]
Thus, national capability will depend on generative AI tools which are
reliable, safe, responsible, and trustworthy.
We have identified how generative AI can
unlock the UK’s potential for augmented productivity by changing the ways
things are produced. However, there are several impediments to UK businesses’
access to and use of generative AI.
Figure 3 sets out some of the chief legal,
regulatory, economic, cultural, and societal impediments to the adoption of
generative AI in the UK. This section gives an overview of impediments to the
uptake of generative AI in the UK. It specifically addresses risks associated
with generative AI and what is meant by ethical and responsible AI.
The section also addresses the concerns
regarding personal data, privacy, and data governance, particularly in relation
to copyright, that arise from the development and use of generative AI tools.
Impediment |
Explanation |
Legal &
regulatory |
There is currently no
omnibus Bill in Parliament dedicated solely to regulating AI in the UK. This is in contrast to other jurisdictions, especially the
European Union (EU), where stringent legislation is being adopted. While the
UK is considering regulating aspects of AI, notably through the Online Safety Bill and particularly through regulators, no
legislative initiative specifically addresses generative AI or foundation
models—as illustrated by the examples below. The UK Government has
taken steps to regulate AI through a ‘pro-innovation approach’ by which the Government wants to use
regulators to encourage business to adopt five ethical principles when using
generative AI. The five principles are modelled on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)’s principles for the regulation of AI. The UK has also signed up through its
membership of the UNESCO recommendations on
the Ethics of AI. While there is no
specific legislation for generative AI in the UK, the use of these
technologies must still conform to existing law, such as the Data Protection Act 2018 or intellectual property laws. The UK’s
Intellectual Property Office is currently working on a draft code for copyright
and AI that will address inter alia the
contentious issue of text and database mining exceptions, which the
Government had earlier proposed for the development of AI models and tools. There
is a chance that generative AI will be regulated through the regulatory
framework being developed by the Competition & Markets Authority based on
the regulator’s new statutory powers in the Digital Markets, Competition and
Consumers Bill (DMCC), which is expected to enter into force in the second
half of 2024. A recent report from
the Competition & Markets Authority suggested a collection of principles
to guide regulatory intervention in support of competitive generative AI
markets, built on ready access to the materials to create foundation models,
diversity of business models, choice for businesses in how to use foundation
models and flexibility for consumers in which provides to engage, the
prevention of anti-competitive practices, and transparency about the risks
and limitations of the foundation model products they are using. A cluster of policy initiatives also seek to set guardrails for AI
development, with different levels of implementation. For example, while the
UK has set out a data sharing governance
framework as part of its
national data strategy, it has not adopted specific legislation
to give effect to the framework in the private sector. In contrast, the EU is
adopting the Data Act and the Data Governance Act. In contrast to the
UK, the EU is adopting the AI Act, expected to come into force at the end of
2025. The AI Act will regulate AI according to perceived risks: unacceptable
risk (banned), high risk (transparency, oversight, and accountability
requirements), and low-to-minimal risk (safety and user protection
requirements). Canada has taken a similar approach with its Artificial Intelligence
and Data Act. The EU is also
considering specific AI product safety liability rules for how products are
manufactured and how they should be used. See for example the European
Commission’s proposal for an AI Liability Directive, or the work of the European Centre for
Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT). While there are
numerous initiatives to introduce legislation to regulate AI in the US, the
US so far has encouraged voluntary self-regulation based on the White House’s
Blueprint for an AI Bill
of Rights, setting out
five principles: (1) safe and effective systems, (2) algorithmic
discrimination protection, (3) data privacy, (4) notice and explanation, and
(5) human alternatives, consideration and fallback. The White House has also
published a set of eight voluntary
commitments pledged by leading companies in the AI industry. In addition, in
August 2023 it was announced that the Biden Administration is fast-tracking
an Executive Order to address
risks associated with AI. There are also legal
and regulatory initiatives on State-level, exemplified by the Governor of
California’s recent Executive Order N-12-23 on generative AI, and domain-specific
guidance on the application of existing legislative, for example from blog posts by the Federal Trade Commission on
consumer protections. The US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has also developed a voluntary AI Risk Management
Framework (AIRMF) and Senator
Chuck Schumer has developed a SAFE Innovation Framework for the regulation of AI. In addition, the
US Consumer Product Safety Commission published a report on product safety and
liability on AI in 2021. Numerous issues arise
in relation to product liability and AI, including whether existing laws
cover the systemic risk of harm or if a precautionary principle
approach should be adopted, to whom liability should be assigned, and the
resources and levers available to the regulators. The Department for Business
and Trade and the Office for Product Safety and Standards are currently reviewing the UK’s
product safety regime post-Brexit,
which offers an opportunity to also consider the need for national generative
AI product safety standards. The Trade Union
Congress (TUC) and the Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy at the
University of Cambridge have set up a taskforce to draft a legislative proposal for the
protection of workers and the use of AI. The taskforce will particularly
examine risks associated with privacy, insecurity of work, and discrimination
from the deployment of AI. |
Technical |
There are technical
limitations to the capabilities generative AI can provide business,
particularly when it comes to responsible, transparent, and trustworthy AI.
The effectiveness of tools for auditing for bias or delivering required
levels of explainability continue to be limited. AI
‘hallucinations’, where a generative AI tool makes up information is a
weighty concern about the reliability of these technologies. |
Economic |
Lack of investment as
outlined in earlier sections. |
Cultural |
Business may be
reticent to make use of generative AI whilst employees may be using these
technologies ‘under the radar’, without the quality or legal assurance, which
poses a risk to competitiveness and regulation. There may also be reticence
within the labour force to deploy generative AI either for fear that these
technologies are not trustworthy, or that they will replace workers, thereby
taking away the user’s job. A variety of
organisational processes or cultural factors will also influence patterns of
AI adoption, from internal data management, and an executive understanding of
the potential of AI, to employer-employee relations. Organisational AI
readiness will be an
important influence on overall patterns of adoption |
Societal |
There are numerous
concerns regarding the ethics of generative AI, which lead to questions of
fairness, trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Without a robust
and accountable ethics framework, the public will not trust the use of
generative AI. There is also a risk that without a sound compulsory ethical
framework, generative AI will perpetuate and advance biases and inequalities
within the population, thereby contributing to greater systemic unfairness. |
Figure 3: Impediments
to the uptake of generative AI in the UK
In its interim report published on July 2023, the House of Commons Science, Innovation and
Technology Committee summarised the barriers to implementing safe and effective
AI as 12 AI challenges:
1. The Bias challenge
2. The Privacy challenge
3. The Misrepresentation challenge
4. The Access to Data challenge
5. The Access to Compute challenge
6. The Black Box challenge
7. The Open Source challenge
8. The Intellectual Property and Copyright challenge
9. The Liability challenge
10. The Employment challenge
11. The International Coordination challenge
12. The Existential challenge
While not negating the importance of AI
safety, this policy brief narrowly focuses on how to build UK’s capabilities
for productivity using generative AI. We therefore only consider risks that
pose impediments to that goal. There are three chief impediments to building
the UK’s capabilities in this regard.
First, there is the risk that a lack of trust
in generative AI becomes so pervasive that the deployment of these technologies
is rejected by businesses and the public. Second, there is the risk that
generative AI will be subjected to legal and ethical regimes which will be
overly restrictive and thus hamper its full potential. Third, the issue with AI
hallucinations, whereby the generative AI tool makes up information, alongside
other technical limitations, poses a challenge to their reliability which again
is an impediment to their uptake nationally.
This section briefly examines risks
associated with generative AI and the legal and ethical frameworks that are
emerging to address these. Fundamentally, the British public must be able to
trust the use of generative AI. There are many conceptualisations of risks
associated with generative AI.
The list below is not intended to be read as
a complete overview, but rather a list of some of the most prominent concerns
related to AI. Numerous risks are associated with generative AI, including
risks to personal data, privacy, and intellectual property. There are risks
that due to lack of transparency or accountability, generative AI may produce
unreliable outcomes, or be used for hidden or unacceptable outcomes.
Key concerns with generative AI applications
are the reliability or veracity of the outputs, especially as the capacity of
non-technical users to produce deepfake images, audio, and video abounds.
Scholars have also identified risks of negative environmental consequences, the
overrepresentation of hegemonic viewpoints and value-lock in training data, the
risk of propagating toxic stereotypes and racist, sexist, and ableist
ideologies, marginalising communities, violating personal data, and subjecting
people to abusive language, hate speech, micro-aggressions, derogating
language, dehumanising and denigrating content and framing, which could lead to
psychological harm.[37]
There are risks that data scraping for
training foundation models violates copyright laws, or that the foundation
models will reproduce bias, which may produce illegal outcomes, especially when
generative AI is used in the context of social services, policing, and
education. The cumulative effect of these risks is the erosion of trust in the
technology, and of societal trust overall.
According to the Ada Lovelace Institute: “It
is also unlikely that international agreements will be effective in making AI
safer and preventing harm, unless they are underpinned by robust domestic
regulatory frameworks that can shape corporate incentives and developer
behaviour in particular.” (Ada Lovelace Institute, Regulating AI in the UK, p. 5).
Responsible AI means demonstrating how the
ethical principles are adhered to throughout all the stages of the generative
AI lifecycle.[38] To do
so, there must be appropriate accountability, risk mitigation, and liability.[39]
In terms of building national capabilities for the workforce, there are particular concerns regarding automated decision-making and
the role of humans in the loop.
Numerous voices have expressed concern that
generative AI is not responsible or ethical. To meet these concerns about the
use of AI more broadly, the Government has proposed a guiding principle-based framework. The principles are drawn from the work of the OECD and as such build on the emerging
international consensus for ethical and responsible AI. This principle-based
approach is dependent on regulatory capacity to be effective.
The UK’s government’s value-based principles
are:
·
Safety, security and robustness
·
Appropriate
transparency and explainability
·
Fairness
·
Accountability and
governance
·
Contestability and
redress
The principles are designed to be
future-oriented and flexible, with the intention of promoting growth and
innovation.
OECD’s
value-based principles for AI:
· Inclusive growth, sustainable development, and well-being
· Human-based values and fairness
· Transparency and explainability
· Robustness, security, and safety
· Accountability
While not legally binding, the Government
envisions that sector-specific regulators will adopt the principles as fit to
their sectors and industries. However, this approach may pose challenges in
ensuring that regulators have the incentives, resources, or mandate to do so,
especially as many regulators’ remits are constrained by statutory language.
Thus, the approach has been challenged by leading academics, pointing to the need for more holistic thinking.
It is also problematic that the Government’s
principles are so vague as to be nearly vacuous.[40]
It is, for example, difficult to discern with any certainty whether the
principles are focused on outcomes or how those outcomes are to be achieved.
However, elsewhere, for example in data
protection, the Government has suggested that regulation should be based on
outcomes; an approach that could potentially be taken for the five value-based
principles as well. (Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Data: A new direction, 10 September 2021, updated 23 June 2023, p. 7.)
As the principles are not legally binding, it
is unlikely that businesses will have an adequate incentive to adopt all the
principles unless there are compelling competitive advantages to doing so.
While the Government has provided tools such as the Algorithmic Transparency
Recording Standard, which aims to support the implementation of ethical AI
principles, the extent to which such tools are being implemented in practice is
not clear.
Thus, the Ada Lovelace Institute has noted
that: “The principles will not – initially – be placed on a statutory footing,
and so regulators will have no legal obligation to take them into account,
although the Government has said it will consider introducing a ‘duty to have
regard’ to the principles.” (Ada Lovelace, Regulating AI in the UK, p. 16.)
The House of Commons Science, Innovation and
Technology Committee has criticised the
Government’s unwillingness to consider AI-specific legislation, noting that:
“[t]here is a growing imperative to ensure governance and regulatory frameworks
are not left irretrievably behind the pace of technological innovation.” (The governance of artificial intelligence;
interim report, Ninth Report of
Session 2022-23, p. 3.).
Thus, rather than see legislation as an
impediment to the development of the UK’s competitiveness in generative AI, we
echo the sentiment of the review of the digital technologies, led by Sir
Patrick Vallance, that: “Well-designed regulation and standards can have a
powerful effect on driving growth and shaping a thriving digital economy.” (HM
Government, Pro-innovation Regulation of Technologies
Review: Digital Technologies (March 2023), p.
3.)
While calls for legislation are mounting, it
does not mean that the content of AI legislation is self-evident. Legal rules
that are too specific risk being quickly outdated while principles that are too
broad or vague risks being meaningless.
The challenge is therefore how to find the
regulatory approach that will be robust and future-proof. Legislation would
also clarify the chain of liability throughout the value-chain and lifecycle of
generative AI.
For example, the All-Party Parliamentary
Group on Data Analytics (APGDA) has noted that: “there are issues around
transparency, explainability, and accountability in
relation to third party/outsourced AI system development. For example,
attention was drawn to the difficulty of testing for bias in third party
systems.” (Policy Connect, An Ethical AI Future: Guardrails &
catalysts to make artificial intelligence a force for good, 19 June 2023, p. 10.)
Legislation could clarify the standards and
responsibility of testing that would befall UK businesses using third-party
generative AI systems. A key issue with applying the
law or ethical principles to generative AI is that the outcome is personalised
or bespoke, therefore making predictability or comparison difficult. “Generated
content is probabilistically and randomly generated based on certain input (or
‘prompts’), which are usually written by a human.
“Therefore, the output of any given
generative AI model is likely to be different for each person prompting the
model and may both resemble patterns in the training data or appear to be
something completely new.” (Forbrukerrådet, Ghost in the Machine: Addressing the
consumer harms of generative AI, June 2023, p.
8.) A recent review of 10 foundation models found that none met the compliance requirements
set out in the EU’s draft AI Act.
There is a question of whether generative AI
should go through an approval or vetting process before being used, or if
redress and contestability should be used as a deterrent for unacceptable
practices. Accountable principles also means that there must be ways to audit
the generative AI systems, which will require access to data for researchers
and for regulators.
A right to access to data for researchers in
relation to the processing of personal data has been proposed included in the Online Safety Bill in relation to
the online information environment, but this has yet to be adopted by
Parliament. Further there are no legal stipulations for data access in the
legislative pipeline with regard to generative AI in
the UK.
Many of the ethical concerns regarding
generative AI are linked to the use of personal data and privacy. These
concerns span personal data that is being inputted into generative AI systems,
personal data generated by these systems, and uses of generative AI systems for
surveillance.
Some of these fears should be alloyed with
the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and its forthcoming replacement, the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill. The UK’s data protection framework is based on the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which includes
the stipulation that all processing of personal data must adhere to the data
processing principles.
The data processing principles are: (1)
lawfulness, fairness, and transparency; (2) purpose limitation; (3) data
minimisation; (4) accuracy; (5) storage limitation; (6) integrity and
confidentiality; and (7) accountability. That means that all uses of personal
data by generative AI must respect these principles as a matter of law.
As the legislation covers all forms of
personal data its remit is broader than processing that concerns privacy. The
legal definition of personal data is technologically neutral and comprehensive
to ensure that all forms of personal data fall under its scope.
Article 3 of the DPA defines personal data as:
“…any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual…
[meaning] a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to: (a) an identifiers such as a name, an identification
number, location data or an online identifier, or (b) one or more factors
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of the individual.”
The broadness of the definition has
implications for the use of generative AI and may pose a considerable
impediment from the uptake of these technologies by UK companies. The Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has for example ruled that an IP address can be personal data when combined
with other factors held by third parties.
Regardless of where in the process personal
data is generated or the sources from which it is harvested, including public
domain sources, or provided directly (and voluntarily) by an individual, all
the data processing principles still apply in full. There are further
restrictions on the use of sensitive data, which pose challenges for companies
using generative AI as sensitivity may first become apparent once the system
has generated output data.
The use of generative AI poses several
challenges when it comes to compliance with data protection law. It may not be
apparent whether data is personal or not, or the system may generate personal
data unbeknown or unintended by the creator of the AI system. However, it must
be noted that the DPA is not a privacy statute, and that the objective of the
legislation is not to preclude the processing of personal data, but instead to
ensure that the processing is legal. Thus, the DPA does not automatically prevent
the generation and use of personal data in generative AI.[41]
The UK Government clearly recognises the role
personal data has in innovation and AI. In its White Paper on data, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport writes that:
“Innovative uses of personal data are at the forefront of driving scientific
discovery, and enabling cutting-edge technology, like artificial intelligence
(AI)…This means maintaining a clear legal framework overseen by a regulator
that takes account of the benefits of data use, while protecting against the
harms that can come from using personal data irresponsibly.” (p. 6).
The objective of the White Paper on data is
to use “personal data responsibly” (p. 6.), which necessitates an ethical
framework. One of the drawbacks in the context of generative AI of the current
data protection regime is that it is focussed on the right to data protection
of the individuals and as such does not address the potential for systemic risk
of bias, discrimination, and inequality arising from the use of personal data
at scale.
Generative AI needs data and there is
therefore considerable concern and interest in the data that goes into the
training of foundation models and the data that is input into generative AI
systems.
There is growing concern that generative AI
violates intellectual property rights. Legal challenges have been mounted in
the US concerning the use of data scraping for training data which could
violate copyright.
Generative AI has been front and centre of
the recent labour dispute and strike by the SAG-AFRA
trade unions representing actors in the US. Whether any legal dispute will be
successful is highly uncertain, however, the broader point is that the labour
force of the creative industries is under threat from generative AI, which will
have a direct effect on the UK economy as these industries represent 5.6% of GDP.[42]
As mentioned above, the UK’s Intellectual
Property Office is currently drafting a code for AI and copyright in an attempt to answer some of these questions. In the meantime, there
are signals of a broader debate about the societal value and risk associated with absorbing a large
portion of human knowledge into large AI models, potentially impinging on
fundamental human rights, such as access to culture.
As a countermeasure to copyright concerns,
there is a chance that companies will hold data in so-called walled gardens.
That would give the public even less access to open data and would stifle
innovation and productivity. There is still room for clarification of the legal
framework in this regard.
The Government’s approach to AI regulation
would support individual regulators to develop sector-specific frameworks for
the adoption of the value-based principles by UK industry.
In many ways, this is a more concrete and
pragmatic approach than the approach taken by other jurisdictions, notably the
EU, where centralised, overarching principles have been adopted in
comprehensive legislation. As such, the UK is showing more willingness to
operationalise the principles in ways that will have a direct impact on the
development and uptake of generative AI. For example, the Competition and
Markets Authority has proposed a set of principles to regulate the development of AI models.[43]
(Competition & Markets Authority, AI Foundation Models: Initial Report, 18 September 2023.)
The effectiveness of the approach taken by
the Government will depend on regulatory capacity and there is a risk that
efforts will be unnecessarily duplicated, or that regulatory frameworks will
promote contradictory rules.
The Sir Patrick Vallance Review of digital technologies, published in March 2023, found more than 10
different regulators of digital technologies. We concur with others who have
observed a need for centralised regulatory oversight to coordinate the efforts
of the many departments and regulators. This is necessary to ensure that the
UK’s value-based principled framework for the governance of generative AI is
adopted in a consistent manner across the UK’s industrial sectors.
These functions are today met by the Office for Artificial Intelligence and Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation under the Department of
Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), and the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum, which was formed as a membership organisation consisting of four key
regulators: the Competition & Markets Authority, OFCOM, the Information
Commissioner’s Office, and the Financial Conduct Authority.
Alongside recent internal changes to the Government’s
policy delivery infrastructure, through the establishment of DSIT, further
changes to the Government’s interactions with the external expert community are
also expected, which may influence the ability to rapidly identify and respond
to emerging technological changes with regulatory implications.[44]
The UK Government has repeatedly set forth an
ambition of international leadership in AI, both in terms of development and
regulation. In March 2023, the Sir Patrick Vallance Review asserted that the UK had a window of no more than 24 months to realise
that ambition. In relation to the development of regulatory frameworks, the UK
is struggling to keep pace, as suggested by Figure 3 in an earlier section.
While the UK’s Government has resisted calls
for legislation to allow for growth and innovation in the sector, the lack of
AI-specific legal regulation opens the possibility that the safe and
responsible deployment of AI solutions and products will depend on the
enforcement of rules devised and overseen by other jurisdictions or the
international community. The absence of robust legislation poses a serious risk
to the safety and trustworthiness of generative AI solutions, especially when
these are devised wholly or in part by foreign companies.
Being first-to-the-post in adopting
legislation to regulate AI is not necessarily a desirable objective if that
legislation is not robust, balanced, and feasible. However, the UK’s lack of
binding regulation means that despite any ambition of the Government, the UK is
failing to reach its ambition of international leadership in this regard.
Although the National AI Strategy
is concerned with the broader AI field and pre-dates the latest developments in
generative AI, many of the key actions it sets out retain their relevance and
do not need to be repeated here.[45]
We focus instead on innovation and skills policy levers that both support the goal of making the UK a global leader in applying generative AI to the economy, and are not discussed in detail in the National AI Strategy. It is worth noting that exactly how these policy levers are used depends on whether the UK pursues AI Nationalism or a more open approach.
As noted by the National AI Strategy, increased compute capacity is a dependency for the development of most generative AI capabilities. An efficient way of mitigating the UK’s compute deficit would be lobbying hyperscalers to establish GPU-clusters in the UK. This would allow organisations like the NHS to run fine-tuned foundation models with fewer concerns about data security and privacy.
In parallel, subsidies could be increased for companies developing capital-intensive proprietary and/or strategically important generative AI capabilities (e.g. chips; cybersecurity and defence applications). Tax incentives like the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) could be enhanced to increase the supply of early-stage capital to generative AI startups at the application layer.
Glossary
·
AI Nationalism – coined by Ian Hogarth to describe an approach to
national AI policy which prioritises a country’s strategic interests and/or the
economic interests of its citizens
·
Hyperscaler – a
company operating massive cloud computing infrastructure (e.g.
Amazon Web Services)
Tax credits could be introduced for all businesses to incentivise them to apply generative AI technologies to their existing operations and/or to develop new generative AI-powered products and services. Challenge prizes could be launched to identify and disseminate effective bottom-up uses of generative AI by teams and individuals inside organisations operating in industries where productivity gaps have been identified. They can also be used to motivate innovation in industries identified as potential growth areas for the UK economy.
An AI Nationalist approach would imply government acting assertively to steer market outcomes. Public sector procurement of generative AI capabilities could positively favour UK suppliers–for example, public funding for supercomputers could be made contingent on the use of chips designed by UK companies like Graphcore. Acquisitions of major UK generative AI companies by foreign rivals–comparable to the past acquisitions of Deepmind by Google, Arm by Softbank, or Instadeep by BioNTech–could be challenged.
By contrast, an open approach might involve designing a regulatory regime encouraging foreign generative AI entrepreneurs to set up in, or relocate their companies to, the UK. In addition to the National AI Strategy’s plans to make visas easier to obtain, this might include corporation tax and entrepreneurs’ relief incentives. It would not, however, be compatible with the kind of controls on mergers and acquisitions described above.
For generative AI to pervade the economy, school and higher education curriculums would need to be developed to increase both understanding of the technologies and critical thinking about how they are used in practice. Computer science education may need to be reformed, or a new discipline established, to teach software development using no-code and LLMs. These could also be the subject for new Skills Bootcamps, and/or upskilling programmes co-designed with employers and workers.[46]
Regardless of whether an AI Nationalist or open strategy is pursued, our view is that legislation and regulation will be needed to remove impediments to the adoption of generative AI and ensure that the British public can trust organisations’ use of the technology. We favour government adopting a principled approach to introducing legislation that would embed an ethical framework for the governance of generative AI in domestic law in multiple sectors.
It should forbid high-risk uses of generative AI, for example in the operation of critical infrastructure, where it could pose a significant threat to human safety or violate fundamental ethical rules.
Legislation takes a long time to pass. In the interim we recommend the adoption of soft governance models, such as the IEEE7001 Standard on Transparency, together with moves to strengthen regulatory capacity. International standards may also be used as frameworks for legislative proposals.
We therefore support the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Data Analytics’ (APGDA) recommendation for a centralised AI office with a renewed strategic focus to not only oversee and coordinate AI regulation across regulators, as set out in the Government’s White Paper, but also to ensure that regulators enforce regulation. This could be achieved by, for example, bolstering the remit to the Office of Artificial Intelligence with a strategic focus on work programmes that identify regulatory gaps and empower existing regulators to deliver responsive regulatory interventions in their domains.
There continues to be a need for capacity building among regulators. Although this is well under way in some domains, as seen from the framework being developed by the Competition & Markets Authority, others will need further support to deliver the Government’s current AI White Paper proposals.
In addition, as is already recognised, regulators need to enhance their existing co-operation to ensure clarity about responsibilities, as the technology will cut across all sectors. This coordinating function may need additional or more active guidance and support than is currently proposed. It is crucial that the regulatory oversight mechanism has sufficient resources and expertise to test and oversee the use of generative AI to build national capabilities for productivity, and be transparent about the oversight in order to inspire public confidence.
Dr Ann Kristin Glenster is Senior Policy Advisor on Technology Governance and Law at the Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy. The Executive Director of the Glenlead Centre, she is a legal expert on information technology law and regulation in the UK, US, and EU. She holds a UK qualifying law degree, has been a doctoral visiting scholar at the Harvard Law School, and holds a PhD in Law from the University of Cambridge.
Sam Gilbert is an affiliated researcher at the Bennett Institute for Public Policy. He is the author of Good Data: An Optimist’s Guide to Our Digital Future (Welbeck Publishing, 2021) as well as influential reports on data ethics, crypto, web3, the metaverse, and online safety. Previously, he was Employee No. 1 and Chief Marketing Officer at the fintech unicorn ManyPets, and held senior roles at Experian and Santander.
The table below briefly summarises some of the other policy areas generative AI bears on–all of which deserve more thorough exploration than is possible here. The table is included to demonstrate how generative AI will have an impact across society, and also to show that while we are aware of that impact, this brief has too narrow a focus to allow a full investigation of these implications.
Glossary
· Jailbreak –
to modify a model or device with the objective of removing restrictions put in
place by its developer
Policy area |
Issues |
Competition |
At the foundation model
layer, access to compute and the concomitant capital requirements represent
significant entry barriers. The market may tend towards monopoly, further
entrenching incumbents (not least Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Meta) and/or
producing a new generation of big tech, with gatekeeping power over models
enabling the extraction of economic rents. The release of open
source models (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion) somewhat mitigates the
threat to competition, but increases exposure to online harms (see above). |
Labour market |
Concerns over AI-driven job
displacement are not new. While few jobs are at risk of full automation by
generative AI, its aptitude for writing,
classification, and summarisation
seems likely to lead to job losses in customer service operations,
administration, and creative industries. |
Online harms |
Open
source foundation models can be
run on users’ own infrastructure, giving them the opportunity to circumvent
controls on dangerous, illegal, or otherwise harmful uses. Stable Diffusion has been used to create child sexual abuse material,
while jailbreaking LLMs allows them to be used to automate, optimise and
scale harmful practices ranging from fraud (e.g. phishing, romance scams) to
online radicalisation. |
Information environment |
Generative AI tools make webspam, misinformation, and disinformation easier and
cheaper to produce at scale. Predictable consequences include a general
dilution of the quality and factual accuracy of content available online; the
proliferation of fake consumer reviews and inauthentic social media accounts;
and increased volumes of ‘fake news’, political propaganda, and extremist
material. |
Education |
ChatGPT has already had a disruptive impact on secondary
and higher education institutions, thanks to its ability to produce
plausible-sounding original essays and coursework with minimal input on the
part of students. Written assignments and methods of assessment will
obviously need to evolve–but this may present an opportunity to incorporate
teaching of generative AI skills like prompt engineering into school and
university curriculums (see below). |
Social justice |
Generative AI systems are
prone to the same forms of embedded
gender, class and racial bias
as AI systems used for classification and decisioning tasks. |
Climate |
Training
foundation models is
computationally intensive and therefore energy hungry. The carbon footprint
of generative AI development is likely to be exacerbated by arms-race dynamics, and could be in tension with Net Zero goals. Generative AI which raises
questions about whether the benefit from the use of generative AI will
outweigh its negative impact on the climate, and/or if that impact can be
offset by other climate change action. For example. Australia’s Chief
Scientist observes that: “Managing the energy and water consumption of
training and retraining (including data collection and cleaning) and
operating LLMs and MFMs is a challenge. While techniques have improved the
energy efficiency of algorithms, hardware upgrades and increasing levels of
e-waste from computer components will heighten demand for critical minerals
with resultant environmental and human rights impacts.” Australian Government
Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Safe and responsible AI in
Australia (Discussion Paper, June 2023), p. 13. |
Geopolitics |
Generative AI is completely
dependent on the availability of GPUs, meaning it is subject to the dynamics
of the chip market. GPUs contain rare earth metals, and as with other
advanced chips, the majority are manufactured by Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company. |
“AI
Foundation Models: Initial Report.” 2023. Gov.uk <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1185508/Full_report_.pdf> [accessed 22 September 2023]
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[31] Cooke, Elizabeth. 2023. “AI Model Collapse Could Spell Disaster for AI Development, Say New Studies,” Verdict <https://www.verdict.co.uk/ai-model-collapse-could-spell-disaster-for-ai-development-say-new-studies/> [accessed 22 September 2023]; [N.d.-e]. Datacentremagazine.com <https://datacentremagazine.com/articles/the-liquid-cooled-future-of-high-performance-compute> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[32] Coyle, Diane. 2023. “The Promise and Peril of Generative AI,” Social Europe (SE) <https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-promise-and-peril-of-generative-ai> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[33] “ChatGPT Plugins.” [n.d.]. Openai.com <https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt-plugins> [accessed 21 September 2023]; Dohmke, Thomas. 2023. “GitHub Copilot for Business Is Now Available,” The GitHub Blog <https://github.blog/2023-02-14-github-copilot-for-business-is-now-available/> [accessed 22 September 2023]; McDonald, Clare. 2022. “Around 750 New Software Developer Jobs Advertised Every Day,” Computerweekly.com <https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252523586/Around-750-new-software-developer-jobs-advertised-every-day> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[34] Milmo, Cahal. 2023. “ChatGPT Limited by Amazon and Other Companies as Workers Paste Confidential Data into AI Chatbot,” INews <https://inews.co.uk/news/technology/chatgpt-limited-amazon-companies-workers-paste-confidential-data-ai-chatbot-2254091> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[35] Ito, Aki. 2023. “Employees Are Secretly Using ChatGPT to Get Ahead at Work,” Business Insider <https://www.businessinsider.com/chatgpt-secret-productivity-work-ai-technology-ban-employees-coworkers-job-2023-8> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[36] ‘Trustworthy AI’ is a contested term. The European Commission’s Independent High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence identifies three components of Trustworthy AI: (1) it should be lawful, complying with all applicable laws and regulations; (2) it should be ethical, ensuring adherence to ethical principles and values; and (3) it should be robust, both from a technical and social perspective.
[37] Emily M. Bender et al., On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?, FaccT’ 21, March 3-10, ACM https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3442188.3445922
[38] AI ethics is a growing academic field with numerous different interpretations of the term. Some relevant scholarly articles are Robert Ganna and Emre Kazim, Philosophical foundations for digital ethics and AI ethics: a dignitarian approach, AI and Ethics (2021) 1: 405-423; Samuele lo Piano, Ethical principles in machine learning and artificial intelligence: cases from the field and possible ways forward, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (2020) 7-9; Jessica Fjeld, Nele Achten, Hannah Hilligoss, Adam Christopher Nagy, Madhulika Srikumar, Principled Artificial Intelligence: Mapping Consensus in Ethical and Rights-based Approaches to Principles for AI, Berkman Klein Center For Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2020, Ibo van de Poel, Embedding Values in Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems, Minds and Machine 2020 30:385-409.
[39] Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Safe and responsible AI in Australia (Discussion paper June 2023), pp. 8-9.
[40] The Central Digital and Data Office expounded on these principles in its Data Ethics Framework for the use of digital technologies, including AI, in 2020. However, this guide is only for the public sector and does not have the force of law.
[41] However, several European data protection authorities are examining whether generative AI tools comply with the GDPR. Notably, the Italian data protection authority has placed a temporary ban on an OpenAI generative chatbot for failing to provide information as required under the GDPR. The Spanish Data Protection Authority is also investigating ChatGPT for breaches of GDPR. Furthermore, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has set up a taskforce to examine whether generative AI is compatible with the GDPR. It must, however, also be noted that these concerns regard whether generative AI comport with the data-processing principles for the processing of personal data, not whether they should be banned outright as illegal.
[42] See https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/arts-and-creative-industries-the-case-for-a-strategy/#:~:text=The%20creative%20industries%20sector%20contributed,the%20UK%20economy%20in%202021.
[43] The principles are: (1) ensuring that foundation model developers have access to data and computing power, and that early AI developers do not gain an entrenched advantage; (2) that both closed and open source models are allowed to develop; (3) that businesses have a range of options to access AI models – including developing their own; (4) that consumers should be able to use multiple AI providers; (5) that no anticompetitive conduct like ‘bundling’ AI models into other services take place; (6) that consumers and businesses are given clear information about use and limitations of AI models.
[44] The AI Council and Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation have recently come to the end of their term or been disbanded, with plans for an alternative approach to external engagement in development.
[45] “National AI Strategy - HTML Version.” [n.d.]. Gov.uk <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy/national-ai-strategy-html-version> [accessed 22 September 2023]
[46] “Find a Skills Bootcamp.” 2022. Gov.uk <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/find-a-skills-bootcamp> [accessed 22 September 2023]